Dec 18, 2023
Last time we spoke about the Russian counter offensive at Telissu. Kuropatkin sought to maintain a defensive posture and wait for reinforcements before launching offensives, but his superiors forced him to perform a hopeless attempt to rescue Port Arthur. With multiple Japanese armies on the move, Kuropatkin could not send the appropriate numbers necessary to relieve the city, and this led to utter disaster. Lt General Stakelberg was given the unfortunate job of advancing southwest to Prot Arthur and would end up running into the Japanese around Telissu. Despite being able to fortify the position and taking up a defensive posture, the battle would prove disastrous for the Russians. Everything was going quite well until the Japanese snuck upon the Russian right flank which buckled and opened the door to a rout. Stakelberg courageously led a counter attack to try and salvage the battle, but it was lost and with it the rescue of Port Arthur.
#78 The Russo-Japanese War part 5: The Japanese advance to Liaoyang
Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.
After the battle of Telissu General Oku’s 2nd IJA rested for four days. While this was going on, the remainder of the 6th division arrived to Oku’s command. Meanwhile there was no rest for the Stakelberg’s men. The Russians overestimated the 4th IJA’s strength and now Stakelberg was receiving orders to occupy Kaiping to make sure the 10th IJA division could not threaten it. The battered men were not to happy to be tossed into another melting pot again. Their rearguard was provided by Lt General Simonov, but he became gravely ill and had to hand over command to Major General Samsonov. By June 20th, the 1st Siberian army corps took their new position at Kaiping. Despite the Russian losses, there was a lot of international criticism aimed at the Japanese. For all of their victories, they kept allowing the Russian forces to get away, they never pursued them too heavily. All four Japanese armies were experiencing supply issues. For example Oku’s 2nd IJA were supplied via Pulantien which was being rocked around by monsoons. Over at Dalny, the Russians had abandoned countless railway wagons, but had the good sense to remove their engines at least. The Japanese had a quick answer to this, they bought some engines from America, however the naval squadron at Vladivostok made a raid and managed to intercept two steamers carrying the engines over, now they sat at the bottom of the sea. This greatly delayed some heavy siege artillery for Nogi’s 3rd IJA to hit Port Arthur.
Regardless of the logistics hiccups, three Japanese armies still had to coordinate their advance upon Liaoyang. They needed to concentrate their efforts to exert a constant pressure on the Russians to thwart them consolidating properly. To gain access to the Liao valley, the Japanese were forced to go through the passes of Taling, Fenshuling and Motienling. Kuropatkin gave the job of blocking these areas to General Count Keller, who was seizing command of the Russian Eastern Force from the disgraced Zasulich from the Yalu disaster. Keller would have 25,000 men guarding the Motien Pass lying astride the Liaoyang and Antung roads. Keller was an intelligent and brave soldier, he had worked under Kuropatkin for quite some time. He was loyal to Kuropatkin, in truth they were quite good friends. Keller began to study the Japanese actions and he noticed they were extremely similar to what they had done during the Sino-Japanese War. Thus given history was to repeat itself as they say, he predicted the three Japanese armies would converge at Haicheng as they had done 10 years prior. Kuropatkin agreed with his friend's prediction and set about building up a force at Haicheng with the view it would stop the advance of the 2nd or 4th IJA.
Kuropatkin at this stage began making a bit of a mess of troop deployment and movements. He became obsessed multiple places would be hit by the Japanese and real or imaginary tried to plug said gaps in his greater manchurian defensive line. He dispatched a brigade of the 5th infantry division of Stakelberg’s force to hold a position at Tashihchiao and this would affect an upcoming battle. Now Keller over at the Motien pass was already weakened, because he had forces under him taken to help at the Telissu battle. Now he was receiving orders to release two more regiments to strengthen Haicheng. Kuropatkin then believed Kuroki’s 1st IJA were about to advance up Fenghuangcheng, so he ordered Keller to advance his force there to block against them. Likewise General Rennenkampf stationed at Saimachi was ordered to take his 5000 cavalry force and block Kuroki’s advance at Aiyangcheng.
Keller gathered 7 and a half battalions and began his advance against Kuroki. In 36 hours his men traveled over 40 miles, they became exhausted. They were 10 miles within reach of Fenghuangcheng and not a single Japanese had been seen. Keller and his men waited awhile, then ultimately pulled back to Motienpass by June 18th. General Kashtalinski made a report of these actions to a German military observer, Von Tettau stating “all that was achieved by this action was the ruination of 8000 pairs of boots, an item we are in short supply”. On June 19th, the Japanese scouts gave word of Rennenkampfs advance against Aiyangcheng. Thus the Japanese reinforced their detachment from Fenghuangcheng over to Aiyangcheng to make a defense. Yes, it turned out when Keller advanced he stopped 10 miles away from Fenghuangcheng not bothering to check the city to see if the Japanese were there. As a result Rennenkampf launched a failed attack against Aiyangcheng on June 22nd and was easily driven off. Kuroki could have made more of these two locations and given real battle, but he chose to hold back, his attention was drawn securing the railway line to his favored target, the Motienpass.
The 1st and 4th IJA received orders on the 19th and 22nd to advance. General Kawamura with the 4th would hit the Fenshuiling pass, defended by a Russian brigade. Kuroki believed the 2nd IJA would hit Kaiping around the same time, so he planned to hit the Motienpass in unison. General Oku’s advanced had stalled somewhat on June 21st around Hsiungyaocheng where he was forced to make camp and await supplies. He would remain there until July 6th as the Japanese were trying to solve numerous logistical issues. Railway carts from Pulantien heading for Telissu were improved upon, Chinese coolies were hired en masse for the job. The logistical situation did improve, but what would really make a difference was the seizure of Port Arthur that held all the facilities, equipment and railway functions necessary to send large loads.
Speaking of Port Arthur the new Admiral Witgeft was under pressure from Alexeiev and by proxy the Tsar to break out of the harbor and try to join up with the Vladivostok squadron. On June 20th there was a proposed departure for the fleet, everything was ready to go, then disaster struck. The editor of Bezobrazov’s “Novoe Krai” published a special edition literally announcing the departure that very day. Witgeft was forced to abandon the break out attempt to the dismay of the sailors eager to get out of the harbor as it looked like Port Arthur was going to face a siege soon. On June 23rd the fleet did depart, traveling carefully through the mine fields. Then at 6pm the IJN warships appeared over the horizon. The Russians saw the IJN Chinyen who was patrolling the Korean straits. Witgeft believed the entire combined fleet must be in the vicinity, but in truth Togo had dispatched 8 cruisers to hit the Vladivostok squadron who downed their two steamers back on the 15th. Togo received word from the Chinyen that the Tsarevitch and Retvizan were amongst the Russian ships. Togo was shocked the two battleships were repaired and out in the open sea, the Russians held a 6-4 advantage for larger ships. The IJN still held superior numbers with 53 ships vs Witgefts 18 however. By dusk the two opposing fleets began sailing parallel from another at a course of 18 miles. It was to be a moonlit evening, fit for battle.
Despite the moonlit the advantage was to be had by torpedoes rather than naval gunfire, something the IJN would become specialists at during WW2. The Japanese had much more destroyers and torpedo boats and thus held a distinct advantage. Togo steered his flagship Mikasa towards the Russian line. Witgeft lost nerve and ordered the fleet to turn to starboard trying to make a return to Port Arthur and the security of her shore batteries. Upon seeing the Russians turning, Togo ordered his destroyers and torpedo boats to launch attacks upon their own attrition, rather than risking his battleships. In retrospect, Witgeft should have given battle and done as much damage as possible to the IJN battleships, given what would occur later at Port Arthur. But that is of course retrospect, maintaining the Pacific fleet in the hopes they could join the incoming baltic fleet was the winning idea of the day. The Russian fleet made a orderly retreat to Port Arthur trying to take it slow lest they hit mines. Only the Sevastopol would run into a mine, no other Russian warships were significantly damaged by naval gunfire or torpedoes. As for the IJN smaller warships, 5 of them took some hits from shore batteries, but no one sank. While it did not look like a significant engagement, it was another blow to the morale of the Russian navy and Togo had yet again managed to bottle up the Russians.
On June the 24th a rather strange order was issued from the IJA general HQ to all units “The fact has been proved that the Russian fleet is able to issue from the harbour of Port Arthur. The transport of provisions which will be required by the combined Manchurian Armies after their arrival at Liaoyang is therefore rendered uncertain, and it is not advisable for the Second Army to advance further north than Kaiping for the present. The battle of Liaoyang, which it was anticipated would be fought before the rainy season, will now be postponed till after it. Arrange your operations accordingly.” Why was this a rather strange order? It was inconceivable for the 2nd IJA to be permitted to advance to Kaiping while the 1st and 4th IJA’s had not yet broken through the Fenshuiling and Motien passes. The message thus spelt the doom of the 2nd IJA if the Russians were to find out and concentrate their forces against it. But was the order sent to the Japanese or perhaps was it a ruse for the Russians. The Japanese units uncharacteristically ignored the order, thus one would be led to believe it was a ruse. The actually Japanese plans were for the mountain passes to be secured prior to Oku closing in on the main russian forces. The supposed fake message was the contrary and exactly how the war went in 1894. Kuropatkin ended up taking forces away from the Motien pass to cover the supposed Oku advance. On June 26th Keller forfeited yet another regiment over to Haicheng and Kuropatkin went there himself that day. Thus on the 26 Haicheng held around 41 battalions and 18 cavalry squadrons.
Meanwhile the 4th IJA advanced upon Fenshuiling where the road descends to Haicheng and Tashishchiao astride the railway. The pass held high pine filled mountains to its north and less steep hills to its south with tracks running parallel in a main approach. On the pass the Russians deployed three infantry regiments, three batteries and a cossack battery. West of them was General Mishchenko with his Cossack brigade plus an infantry regiment. On the night of the 25th the Japanese advanced along an unguarded path trying to hook around the rear of the Russian right flank. They had with them some Maxim machine guns and mountain artillery pieces. Another group of Japanese took off their regulation boots and wore Japanese straw sandals to scale the northern face on the mountains undetected to get around the Russian left flank. It took both these detachments a day to maneuver. Altogether the plan was to hit the Russians on the morning of the 27th.
At 5:15am on the 27th the battle commenced with an artillery duel. The Russians had camouflaged their guns using trees. The Japanese frontal assault suffered heavily and by 7am slowed down nearly to a halt. But it was just then when their left and right hooking detachments unleashed their fire power from the hilltops. The Russians were being hit from every angle and were quickly forces to pull back by 8am. As the Russian artillery began to move the Japanese pushed their frontal assault now enjoying better artillery support. By 10am the Russians were overwhelmed and retreating towards Hsimucheng. Their retreat left Mishchenko’s left exposed. Mishchenko attempted a counter attack, but by 7pm was likewise retreating.
The Japanese were able with ease to outmaneuver the Fenshuiling pass, but the Motien pass was another matter entirely. Try to imagine Thermopylae, a very narrow pass that a smaller force could guard with ease, it did not offer any flanking opportunities. Yet all the meddling by Kuropatkin to aid the theoretical attack upon Haicheng depleted Keller of men. Russian morale was at an all time low, man of the soldiers were utterly confused by their superiors orders. An account from the 12th east siberian rifle regiment over the two week period had this to say “This regiment had been ordered to Anshanchan on 15 June, but on reaching that place had been at once sent back to Count Keller. On the 26th it received orders to move to Tawan; but while on the march it received another order to retrace its steps and, at 1 a.m. on the 27th, reached the camp at Chinerhtun which it had left the previous morning. There it was met by an order from General Kuropatkin directing it to march at once to Haicheng. Leaving camp again at 4 a.m. on the 27th, it reached Haicheng on the 28th only to find it was to move next day to Liaoyang, this time by rail. Arriving there on the 30th, orders were again received to rejoin Count Keller’.
As formidable as the Motien Pass was, to the utter shock of the Japanese on June the 30th, they captured it unopposed, the Russians had abandoned the position. A few days before, the 9th east siberian rifle regiment had been taken away from Keller to help out at Haicheng and it seems this caused such a state of indecision, alongside the capture of the Fengshuiling pass, Keller opted to pull back. The rain continued to fall from June 27th to July 5th making movement along the roads a nightmare for carts. Kurokis 1st IJA were suffering from logistical problems, he was forced to put the 12th division on half rations. If the rain persisted for more than 48 hours Kuroki would have had to retire his force to Fenghuangcheng, but the rain came to a temporary stop. When the rain ceased both sides went to work sending scouts to see what the other side was doing. The Russians could not figure out what the Japanese were going to do next, would they try to maneuver around their left flank or perhaps cut westward to the railway? On July 4th a reconnaissance in force was launched against Motienling by three battalions and it was easily repulsed. Meanwhile the Japanese were receiving intelligence from their Chinese spies amongst the Russians who reported the Russians had taken positions on some reverse slopes north of Motienling.
Now July 6th was the date set by the IJA general HQ for the advance of the three armies. General Oku led his four divisions northward and by midday on the 7th was in the vicinity of Kaiping, experiencing little to no opposition along the way. Oku’s scouts reported that Kaiping was garrisoned by Stakelberg’s 1st siberian corps while due north at Tashihciao, Lt General Zarubaiev’s 4th Siberian corps were in the process of reinforcing its garrison. Just above the city of Kaiping was a semicircle of hills dominating a flat open field. On these hills were 20,000 men ready to fire upon the incoming Japanese. Oku was very cautious having his men advance with their artillery placed into combat positions to hit Kaiping around 5:30am on the 9th of July. Stakelberg viewed the Japanese advance to Kaiping and feared an envelopment maneuver, so he withdrew the forces. Thus his semicircle hill position was captured by Oku’s 2nd IJA without a fight and they would dig in and remain there until 22nd of July. During their time on the hill they went to work improving the road, rail and sea lanes to establish better supply lines that could maintain Oku’s advance.
Alexeiev had been pretty quiet for awhile, but in the face of all the territory loss he yet again began meddling. He instructed Kuropatkin that he should take offensive actions to block the advance of the 2nd and 4th IJA and push back the 1st IJA all the way back into Korea. Kuropatkin obviously thought this was folly and wanted to await further reinforcements, in particular the incoming 7th corps. Kuropatkin believed the Japanese strength was twice what it actually was, ironically Alexeiev would have a much more accurate idea of their numbers. Kuropatkin was not 100% against offensive actions however, he did favor Alexeiev’s idea to engage the 1st IJA, but certainly not the multiple offensives against separate Japanese armies. Alexeiev persisted to place pressure on Kuropatkin and against his better judgment he gave orders for Keller to perform a partial offensive against the Motien pass. Kuropatkin proposed Kellers Eastern Force of 40 battalions would attack what was nearly 80 battalions of Kuroki’s 1st IJA, while 97 battalions of the Russian southern force were ordered to withdraw if the 2nd and 4th IJA attacked who represented a combined for of around 90 battalions. You can see the fallacy in this. A large reason Kuropatkin gave such orders to Keller was because Keller was continuously requesting permission to retake Motienling. Keller received some reinforcements from the 9th division and had his force advance in three columns up the roads. As remarked by Kuropatkin of the small offensive “Taking into consideration the considerable increase of the Eastern Force, I ordered Count Keller to take the offensive, so as to again get possession of the passes. He did so, but although he had forty battalions under his command, he advanced with only twenty-four.’
During the night of July 16th the Russians advanced upon Japanese positions that had full telephone and alarm coverage. At 8am the Russians made a frontal assault out in the open and were absolutely cut down by Japanese artillery. The Russians artillery was not even able to help support the attack until 2:10pm whereupon their infantry were already withdrawing. Two other Russian columns advanced and met similar fates. Keller had kept one quarter of his forces in reserve. A british military observer, General Hamilton witnessed the battle and remarked the Russians were still utilizing section volley fire. It seemed to Hamilton they had no idea of the use and value of cover and that their officers led them with undue risks. He did praise their efforts at withdrawing but left the remark “It is passing strange that soldiers so steady and formidable in retreat should be so sticky in the attack”. After their loss, Keller had his men dig in a bit further north around Tawan which lies astride the Fenghuangchang-Liaoyang road.
Kuroki was emboldened by the easy victories and sent the 12th division against the smaller twon of Chiaotou, hoping to use it as a springboard for a possible attack against the Russian lines of communication to Mukden. The garrison at Chiaotou was a brigade group of the 10th corps who were subjected to having their right flank attacked on july the 18th and 19th. The Russians were quickly forced to withdraw up the Liaoyang road. Rennenkampf was with his cavalry unit 25 miles due east and tried to assist them but received a wound to his thigh on the 13th and had to hand over command to General Liubavin. Liubavin dragged his feet around on the issue ultimately doing nothing to help. With the loss of Chiaotou, the rest of the 1st IJA were now advancing and this directly threatened Penshihu which lay along the railway line between Liaoyang and Mukden. Kuropatkin ordered the 10th corp to retake Chiaotou while Keller was to hold out at Tawan. Meanwhile Kuropatkin and Alexeiev continued to argue about strategy. With no real navy to administer, Alexeiev focused on the land war and was even planning the formation of two armies he would lead himself, placing Kuropatkin in command of one of them subordinate to him. You really have to be baffled by this, Alexeiev was an admiral, this was lunacy. Kuropatkin and Alexeiev met at Mukden on July 20th whereupon Alexeiev unfolded his plans to reinforce the Eastern Force who was to engage Kuroki. Kuropatkin remained unconvinced, but obedient nonetheless as he departed for Liaoyang where he publicly announced his intention to resume the offensive.
The 10th and 17th corps were handed over to the Eastern Force while the 2nd IJA resumed their advance northwards, edging closer to the Eastern Force. By July 23rd Oku’s intelligence indicated the enemy force was roughly 4 divisions strong and had defensive lines going 10 miles long to towards the south part of Tashihciao. Tashihciao was strategically important because it sat on the junction of the main and secondary lines of the railway leading to the port city of Yingkou. Taking such a junction would greatly benefit the Japanese logistics. Oku cautiously approached as the 1st and 4th IJA were still occupying the mountains. Oku had his men approach in an extended line going 12 miles with his cavalry brigade screening his left flank. On his right flank was the 5th division followed by the 3rd, 6th and 4th to the extreme left. The Japanese advanced within 5 miles of the southern Russian lines.
Kuropatkin had personally selected Tashihciao and had it fortified heavily. Stakelberg’s 1st Siberian army corp had fallen back to join up with Lt General Zarubaiev’s 4th Siberian army corp, Zarubaiev would have overall command. Zarubaiev was given orders to withdraw to Haicheng if pressed upon by the enemy, yet again you can sense the defeatist mentality amongst the Russian commanders. Stakelberg took the right flank, Zarubaiev the left. Stakelergs sector rested along the railway and to his flank was General Kossogovski’s cavalry brigade, Kossogovski had taken command of the brigade from Samsonov. Zarubaievs sector was along the Tungta river with General Mishchenkos cavalry watching his flank. The Russians had a general reserve of 10 battalions and 16 artillery pieces along the center towards the left in two groupings. The left area was full of hills and ravines, while the right was low flat ground. The Russians had learnt some lessons from their defeats and made sure to have outposts on high grounds to be able to track Japanese movements.
Oku chose to advance along some fields of Kaoliang, providing some concealment, but not nearly enough to hide most of his forces advance. Oku’s intelligence indicated turning either flanks of the Russians would not be easy this time around. An attempt to divert forces against either flank might expose the Japanese lines of communication and spell a disastrous counter attack upon them. Oku decided not to risk anything, he ordered the 5th, 3rd and 6th divisions to launch a frontal assault on July 24th. He believed the 4th IJA’s movements would be on the Russians minds giving him an edge. Oku’s 4th division was held back on the left flank, expected to act against possible counter strokes. The 4th divisions orders were ‘take up a position near Wutaishan and will hold it in strength as a protection for the left flank of the army. No advance will be made therefrom until it is observed that the general attack elsewhere is succeeding.’ Along the far left was the cavalry screen and two infantry regiments held in reserve.
After the Russo-Japanese war Zarubaeiv would go on the record during a Russian staff debriefing, to state he was attacked by both the 2nd and 4th IJA at the battle of Tashihciao. It seems likely the Russians had misidentified the strength of the divisions facing them. The 4th and 6th IJA divisions were correctly identified, but the 3rd and 5th divisions in the hills it seems led the Russians to believe were only a single division and thus the confusion arrived with their movement. Alongside this General Mishchenko had apparently reported to Zarubaiev that the 10th IJA division were in the vicinity.
During the early light of the 24th, the Russians saw three Japanese divisions advancing in a line. The 4 divisions was holding back as ordered and by 5:30am the Japanese artillery began to fire. The Russian left flank began an artillery duel while in the center the IJA 6th division performed what seemed to be a halfhearted assault. By midday the sun was intense and the Russian red cross found themselves extremely busy with cases of sunstroke. At 1pm Stakelberg dispatched an aide over to Zarubaiev, suggesting they should withdraw. Stakelberg stated it was his belief the Japanese main attack was about to hit and if the troops were in the forward trenches they would be met with extremely heavy casualties. He also reminded Zarubaiev, it was not Kuropatkins plan of the campaign to make a firm stand at Tashihciao. No Stakelbergs aid arrived to Zarubaiev’s HQ at the exact same time Zarubaeiv received a report from Zasulich that the 4th IJA were on the move. Zarubaiev was concerned, but not enough to order a withdrawal right away, especially when the sun was blazing at 100 degrees invited disaster for marching. Instead he sent a message back to Stakelberg simply stating he would consider withdrawing by nightfall.
In reality, Stakelberg was greatly overreacting. By 2pm 12 of the 12 Japanese batteries opposing his corps were assigned counter battery operations against two of his batteries beyond the hill line. At 3pm a reinforcement Russian battery joined up with them and combined were keeping the Japanese infantry at bay well into nightfall. The Japanese were taking heavy losses. Meanwhile back at 10:30am the 4th IJA division had advanced while skirmishing with Russian cavalry. At 1pm General Kossagovski performed a halfhearted attack against the Japanese left flank. His men fought with the Japanese 1st cavalry brigade who sent them packing north. Kossagovski reported the grounds too muddy for cavalry actions, but asserted he had effectively drawn the Japanese attention to his sector. At 8pm, Zarubaeiv decided to launch a counter attack upon the left flank given this information. Oku released one of his two reserve regiments to fill a gap that was emerging between his 4th and 6th divisions. Meanwhile the 3rd and 5th IJA divisions were trying to hit a weak point along the Russian line in the center. The 4th corps tossed 72 guns of which 32 were the new quick firing model against the 12 batteries supporting the Japanese. The Japanese were gravely outgunned in rate of fire and range.
Just before noon, Zarubaeiv ordered a counter attack. General Shileiko whose position was on the extreme left of the Russian line was to hit the flank of the 5th IJA division. He was also ordered to confer with Mishchenko and the commander of the general reserve. Mishchenko agreed to release cavalry units to Shileiko’s command but the commander of the general reserve refused to relinquish any of his units stating he had not received any orders to do so. The results was Shileiko’s vanguard being torn to pieces, while Mishchenkos cavalry units stayed safely away on the periphery before withdrawing. The counter attack was an abysmal failure.
At 2pm Oku ordered his right flank divisions to press home their attack with or without artillery support. At 3:30pm the Japanese advanced in the face of terrifying Russian artillery. The 5th IJA division were battered and based the job to the 3rd division to keep moving forward. A Japanese battalion managed to seize a key Russian feature, but were quickly met with a counterattack that dislodged them. The 3rd divisions sector continued to perform intense fighting, but alongside the heat both sides were succumbing to inactivity. Stakelberg’s artillerymen were holding the Japanese at bay, effectively forcing the 2nd IJA to a grinding halt. The Russians still held 6 battalions in reserve while the Japanese held only 1.
The commander of the 5th IJA division was embarrassed by his men's performance and requested Oku allow him to launch a night attack, Oku agreed. At 10pm the 5th division surged across the valley and over some slopes screaming banzai taking the Russians by surprise. The Japanese were able to seize forward positions as the entire 5th division crashed along the front. By early afternoon on the 25th, the Russian position was in Japanese hands, the Russians rearguards were the only ones putting up a fight. Apparently the commanding Russian officer deemed it impossible to recapture the 10 mile front position and ordered a withdrawal. It’s hard to find real numbers on this incredible action, but it is assumed both sides took 1000 casualties each. The taking of this position effectively drove a wedge in the Russian lines and Zarubaeiv decided to order a withdrawal, Kuropatkin gave his support to the decision.
The two Russian corps now withdrew to Haicheng as Oku’s army captured Tashihciao and stayed there until August 1st. The withdrawal left General Zasulich in an exposed position at Hsimucheng. Zasulich ordered his rearguards to protect their flanks which were being harassed by the 2nd IJA. Meanwhile the 5th IJA division was transferred to General Nozu’s 4th IJA. Mishchenkos cavalry joined Zasulich giving the 2nd Siberian corps + a brigade of the 10th corps a total of 33 battalions, 31 squadrons and 80 artillery pieces. Nozu now commanded the 5th, 10th and 4th divisions along with the 10th Kobi brigade. Nozu’s ordered were to attack the Russians whenever possible, so he looked at Hsimucheng as a viable target.
At 2am on July 30th, the 10th division and reserve brigade advanced frontally against the Russian position at Hsimucheng while the 5th division hooked around the left of the Russians trying to cut off their line of retreat. The terrain was rocky and mountainous, not easy to fortify, thus the Russian defensive lines were not great. On the 31st the Japanese main attack hit the right side of the Russian position. Mishchenko’s cavalry and the 4th siberian corp rearguards began withdrawing, but Zasulichs main force held tight, bravely tossing counter attacks against the larger Japanese army. The 5th IJA division advanced upon the Russian right, joined by a detachment from the 3rd IJA division sent over by Oku. Zasulich’s men held until 11pm when orders from Kuropatkin came to withdraw to Haicheng. Yet again the Russians were retreating. At the battle of Hsimucheng the Russians took 1550 casualties and the Japanese 836.
The battle of Hsimucheng also coincided with two other battles. The Russians had mobilized to regain the small town of Chiatou on July 24th and made an advance along the Lan river. The Russian 10th corp, less one brigade under General sluchevski took the lead while General Liubavin took some cavalry to guard the road to Mukden. Now the 10th corps were a European corps and there was great expectation they would walk over the Japanese. After news hit that the men were withdrawing from Tashihciao, Kuropatkin had rushed over to Liaoyang, but just prior ordered Sluchevski the same type of orders he gave Stakelberg at Telissu. The 10th corps divided itself into a vanguard, main body, left and right flank guards and advanced upon the isolated 2nd IJA right flank occupied by the 12th division. By July 30th both sides were grinding to a halt, artillery were dueling it out. 15 miles away were Keller’s two divisions dug in behind the lan River around Tawan and Yangtzuling. Keller had orders to stay where he was. Thus General Sluchevski, Keller and Liubavin could not aid another given their orders.
On the 31st Kuroki resumed his offensive and decided he would hit all 3 of the enemy forces in the area one by one as long as they remained divided. Kuroki was acting independently, but saw such a grand opportunity he had to grab it. Now the 12th division at Chiaotou were about as far from the 2nd division as Sluchevski was from Keller. The 2nd division were guarding Motienling and to their left was a guards division. Early on the morning of the 31st, four battalions of the 2nd IJA division advanced along a goat track to join up with the 12th so they could attack a Russian brigade currently guarding a pass at Pienling, two miles south of Yushuling. The Russian brigade was isolated, but held a great defensive position, not enough so to repel two Japanese divisions however. According to British military observation testimony “In places the path was so narrow that the Russians could not move more than four abreast, and so steep were the hill sides, that they were quite unable to deploy for attack, or to make any effective reply to the Japanese fire. In this short space the losses suffered amounted to five or six hundred killed and wounded” The Russians were only saved from complete disaster by the arrival of a Terek-kuban cavalry regiment who dismounted and aided them.
Sluchevski’s left flank meanwhile was caught by surprise during the night and the 12th division made a lot of progress. Then Sluchevski received a telegram from Kuropatkin telling him Keller was battling some 15 miles away. Kuropatkin had to inform him that expected reinforcements were thus not forthcoming. The 10th corps by this point had suffered 2000 casualties, their reserves were already in the battle. At 6:30 Sluchevskis cavalry left flank guard were deceived by a false report the Japanese artillery were turning to another area. The battle was going to hell in a hand basket as they say. Kuroki planned to hold the Russian front with his 2nd division while the guards division would hook into their right. The two divisions with reserves made a full assault. The Russians bravely tried to counter but failed to stop the onslaught. The Japanese gradually took the Russian forward trenches as the Russians were forced to perform a staggered retreat. The Russians and Japanese had light casualties in the few hundreds for the battle.
Over in Kellers position, Japanese artillery seemed to be hunting down superior officers, Keller was hit by shrapnel tossing him to the ground with 37 wounds killing him instantly. The death of Keller destroyed the troops morale, he was a beloved commander who was notorious for leading at the front. General Kashtalinksi replaced Keller and ordered the reserves to come forward. Kuropatkin advised not tossing the reserves in, stating “hold back until the main effort of the Japanese has been disclosed”. Given the withdrawal at Hsimucheng and Yushuling, Kashtalinski was also told not to withdraw too hastily, but that is just what he did. Thus the road to Liaoyang seemed to be wide open, the Russians were offering nothing but withdrawals after withdrawals, when would they stand firm to fight?
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
As the Japanese advanced, so did the Russians, but in the opposite direction. British Lt General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley’s Operations of War states “Victory can only be won by striking”. Pungent words for Kuropatkin as he scrambled to perform offensives.